Twin Battlles of Helmstedt and Marienborn

24 July 1813

Strategic Map - First light 24 July

At Blucher’s headquarters in Walbeck all was quiet by midnight 23 July. He has joined general Tauentzien, commander of 4^th corps, earlier in the day and they were together when the cuirassier brigadier reported his clash with the French cavalry and his subsequent retreat. Blucher was outraged that the cuirassiers had retreated without a fight and ordered the unhappy brigadier to immediately deploy his brigade to the west of Walbeck in preparation for an advance at daylight.

Blucher suspected that at least one enemy corps was approaching him on the Hanover road. He was unaware that one days march to the south Bulow’s 3^rd corps has also made contact with the enemy.

The Prussian CinC did not hesitate, he ordered Tauntzien to advance on Helmstedt at first light and take the village. He then had his usual large gin and went to bed. Tauntzien was his poorest corps commander but he would accompany 4^th corps at first light and take command during the battle if necessary.

Just 15 miles to the west Davout worked late into the night at his headquarters in Helmstedt. He reasoned that the Prussians would have made preparations to hold Magdeburg, and that a powerful attack would be his best chance of victory.

VI corps was with him at Helmstedt, and XIII just one day’s march to the south at Marienborn. V corps and the cavalry reserve were one days march behind him at Brunswick.

He would use 24 July to concentrate all three corps between Helmstedt and Marienborn. On 25 July he would advance to Madgeburg and drive all before him. By 26 July he would have destroyed Blucher’s army, taken Magdeburg and be in possession of the river Elbe bridges. The Second French army would be poised to advance on Berlin.

He sent urgent messages to XIII corps, V corps and the cavalry reserve. Due to the large numbers of men concentrating in such a small area VI corps would have to move south to leave Helmstedt free for V corps. By midday there would be a solid defence line between Helmstedt and Marienborn.

Tactical Map - First light 24 July

These are the actual locations of each corps at daybreak.

In the north V corps and the cavalry reserve are at Brunswick. They can only move to Helmstedt along the single road L9 and L10. V corps was already in Brunswick when the cavalry reserve arrived, they will therefore lead the advance. This large body of men moving on a single road would delay their arrival at Helmstedt. V corps would arrive at 1600, but the cavalry reserve would not arrive until 2000.

At daybreak VI corps moved south into M11, making for M12. Their cavalry brigade would cover this move. This movement would be under way before the Prussians made their move towards Helmstedt

In the south XIII corps had orders to move from Wolfenbuttel to Marienborn. 3^rd Prussian corps also had orders to move to Marienborn. The French cavalry were unable to hold the town, and withdrew into O10 to await the arrival of the remainder of XIII corps.

Due to the large area involved, there would be two seperate battles, one at Helmstedt and the other at Marienborn. Blucher and Davout were only aware of the fighting at Helmstedt, and would not receive news of Marienborn until nightfall.

The battle of Helmstedt

This is the area of fighting around Helmstedt. VI corps would complete their first move south before the Prussian cavalry arrived on the Walbeck road. The remainder of 4^th Prussian corps would not arrive until 1200

The Battle of Marienborn

The battle at Marienborn is more straight forward. Both commanders were aware that the enemy wanted to take the town. Both were determined that they would take it first. The two cavalry brigades were in contact at first light, and both VI corps and 4^th corps would enter the battle area at 0800.

First Contact

23 July 1813

strategic map

At first light on 23 July 1813 the roads between Magdeburg and Hanover became very busy, with long columns of French military traffic moving east, and Prussian columns moving west. The columns consisted of infantry and artillery, plus miles of supply vehicles. Ahead of each column squadrons of cavalry pushed ahead searching out the enemy

At each town or village cavalry patrols questioned local authorities and searched mail in transit. The arrival of the cavalry prompted masses of civilians to flee, which produced chaos as they met military columns moving in the opposite direction. Each village and cross roads produced havoc as the columns condensed to move through the bottle neck.

It is a six day march from Hanover to Magdeburg, however the nearest French and Prussian corps were much closer than that. Just after midday the first contact of the campaign took place on the high road between Helmstedt and Walbeck.

tactical map

The Prussian cuirassier brigade entered the village of Walbeck at 11am. They had spent the morning screening the advance of 4^th Prussian corps from Colbitz. The sympathic villagers informed them that a large body of the enemy were in Helmstedt and the surrounding area.

The brigade commander had orders to locate and observe the enemy, but not to engage in combat. He ordered one squadron to advance with caution along the Helmstedt road. The remainder of the brigade were drawn up in battle formation just west of Walbeck

Ten miles away a squadron of French chasseurs had posted a skirmish line just west of Helmstedt. The commander was the first to spot the cuirassiers, and raced back to the town to report to his brigade commander. The young French light cavalry brigadier occupied the inn, where he questioned the mayor and post officials about enemy activity, surrounded by a group of admiring local girls.

The news caused him great satisfaction. He would have the honour of the first engagement of the campaign. The chasseur brigade was mustered and left Helmstedt in haste.

Outside the village they formed line of battle and moved towards Walbeck. It was clear from their determined advance that they were about to attack. The Prussian commander ordered his forward squadron to fall back on the main brigade. The French continued their advance, and the Prussians retreated by squadron on Walbeck.

During the retreat a small group of cuirassiers were cut off by the faster moving chasseurs. Casualties were light on both sides, but two Prussians were taken prisoner. They confirmed that Walbeck was occupied by General Tauentzien’s 4^th Prussian corps.

Aware that to advance any closer to Walbeck would open his brigade to unnecessary casualties, the French commander halted five miles short of Walbeck. He established a skirmish line and sent a messenger to report this important news.

The first contact of the campaign was a hailed as a small French victory, and generally agreed that the young brigadier was a fine example of a French light cavalryman.

Introduction to the Test Hanover Campaign

Campaign Background- The Magdeburg Campaign

Northern Germany 1 May 1813

The Hanover Campaign is the sixth phase of the 1813 campaign.

In April 1813 Marshal Davout was appointed CinC of all French troops in Northern Germany. These were mainly the survivors of the Russian campaign of the previous year. He was ordered to hold the line of the river Elbe from Hamburg to Magdeburg.

On 1 May 1813 Prussia declared war on France, and general Blucher was ordered to invade Westphalia, take Magdeburg and secure a crossing of the river Elbe. It was anticipated that this objective could be achieved before the French could build up their forces and take the field.

Against all expectations Marshal Davout had the Second Army battle ready within days of the Prussian advance. He could not prevent Blucher crossing the river Elbe, but he did fight a series of battles for Magdeburg.

On 14 May 1813 Blucher won a narrow victory at the major battle of Magdeburg.

The next day Davout abandoned his defence of the river Elbe and withdrew towards Hanover.

Both armies were battered and weary after a hard fought campaign, both needed rest and reinforcement.

The Hanover Campaign

Northern Germany 22 May 1813

After a period of rest and reorganization on 22 May 1813 Blucher received orders from Berlin to march his army eastwards and take the city of Hanover. The second phase of the battle for Northern Germany had begun.

At the start of the campaign the French army is concentrated in and around Hanover. The Prussian army is in and around Magdeburg

The Campaign Area

Hanover Strategic Map 22 May 1813

The campaign area covers an area 135 miles by 75 miles

The French concentration area is in and around Hanover

The Prussian concentration area is in and around Magdeburg

All movement is by road

The red roads are the major supply routes

The yellow roads are minor supply routes

The brown roads are tracks suitable for movement but not supply vehicles

Second French Army

The Second French Army consists of four corps.

Each corps has four infantry and one cavalry brigades.

Marshal Davout may withdraw cavalry brigades from corps to form a cavalry reserve

First Prussian Army

The First Prussian army also consists of four corps

Each corps has four infantry and one cavalry brigades

No change in this order of battle is allowed.

Decisive victory for Wellington at Baltanas

22 July 1813

Battle of Baltanas

Background

To secure his hold on Valladolid, Wellington must take Baltanas and force Soult to withdraw to Burgos.

Rather than wait for both armies to concentrate and fight a major battle, he orders 1 and 3 corps to take the town before the French can bring up reinforcements.

The French have one corps holding the town, and (unknown to Wellington) a second will arrive by mid morning.

Table at start of battle

Wargames Table

Baltanas is the village in the centre of the photograph

The top road leads to the north coast

The bottom road leads to Madrid

The right hand road leads to Burgos

The left hand road leads to Valladolid

7 French corps in and around the town

Battle

Wellington pins the defenders with Hills corps, whilst Picton advances on the left and attacks the town from the north.

Villate holds the town much longer than expected, but suffers heavy casualties doing so.

Sarrut arrives just in time to check Picton’s advance. His dragoons catch the guards brigade in flank and rout them.

The town is large enough to hold two brigades, and proves a real challenge.

However with two moves to go to nightfall, Hill finally takes both town sections.

Sarrut is still deploying, and largely unaffected by the heavy fighting. He is therefore able to cover the French retreat towards Burgos.

Link to battle report

http://1813valladolidcampaign.blogspot.com/

Effect on the Campaign

This is a convincing victory for Wellington and secures his hold on Valladolid.

Marshal Soult has been unable to concentrate his whole army to fight for Valladolid, but there is nothing to stop him doing so in front of Burgos.

This Campaign has gone to Wellington, but the war is far from over.

Wellington takes Valladolid

21 July 1813

British

Wellington has concentrated all of his army north of the river Douro

1^st and 3^rd move advance to Valladolid, and the French withdraw

1 and 3 corps passing through Valladolid

French

Davout has also concentrated his army at Palencia.

He is in a good position to oppose any advance on Burgos

French withdraw to Palencia

20 July 1813

British

Wellington is concentrating his army at Simcanas in preparation for an attack on Valladolid

Wellington reviews 1^st and 3^rd corps at Simcanas

French

Davout orders concentration at Palencia.

7^th corps will hold Valladolid for one day to cover withdrawal.

A muddled victory for Wellington at Valladolid

19 July 1813

Background

Despite his setback at Duenas, Wellington is aware that he must take Valladolid before the French can concentrate their army north of the river Duero.

He orders 1^st corps to attack the city at first light.

4^th corps will march south through the mountains and prevent Leval from supporting the garrison.

Wargames table at start of battle

Table

The French have two brigades to hold the city, the remainder of 7^th corps will deploy north of the city to protect the Duenas road until 6^th corps arrive.

1^st British corps will enter the table from the left along the bottom road.

5^th corps, who have better roads from Duenas, will arrive at move one on the top road.

4^th corps, who have to march through the mountains, will arrive top left on move two.

Battle Summary

1^st British corps attack on Valladolid ends in disaster.

To prevent the garrison deploying north of the city, Wellington orders 1^st corps to move angle north in column of march behind a hussar brigade in line. This is a dangerous manoeuvre, as they can not fight in column of march.

The French cavalry move forward and charge the hussars. The hussars fail their morale and will not counter charge. They lose the resulting melee and rout. Without cavalry support the infantry must form square, and the gunners abandon their guns to seek safety with the infantry.

The French 12 pounder guns have a much longer range than the British 6 pounders. This combined with the loss of their cavalry makes any further advance impossible. Wellington orders 1^st corps to withdraw out of artillery range.

Fortunately 4^th corps has more success. They attack the French as they march towards Valladolid. Leval has lost his cavalry at Duenas, and must form square to keep the enemy cavalry at bay.

This allows Alten to outflank the French and attack them from the north. The brigade holding the right flank has suffered casualties at Duenas. Despite this it holds long enough for the remainder of the corps to move south in square.

The result is a confused battle with no real winner and no real loser.

Effect on the Campaign

Although only a partial victory, Wellington has taken the French right flank.

Unless Soult can drive the British back, they can now bring superior numbers to bear on Valladolid.

Soult must now decide whether to risk a counter attack, or to withdraw east towards Burgos.

Link to Battle Report

http://1813valladolidcampaign.blogspot.com/